Autoriai: ALASDAIR MACINTYRE
Brūkšninis kodas: 4202205
Ieškoti VUB kataloge
"What is justice?" asked Socrates in the Republic. The nature of justice, and how we are to judge it, have been fundamental issues in moral philosophy ever since. Aristotle and Augustine, Aquinas and Hume all had very different ideas of justice, and even in our own day we are plagued by the concept and its applications.
It is a central thesis of this book that conceptions of justice and practical reason emerge from particular types of social order particular communities and are developed as rational conceptions by particular socially embodied traditions. Not
only that. The rational evaluation of such conceptions can only be carried through from the standpoint of some particular tradition.
How then can we judge between competing claims? In this important sequel to After Virtue, Alasdair MacIntyre shows how for each of us only the history of our own and of rival traditions can justify our moral choices.
Alasdair MacIntyre, formerly Fellow of University College, Oxford, is W. Alton Jones Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at Vanderbilt University, Tennessee.
I Rival justices, competing rationalities 1
II Justice and action in the Homeric imagination 12
III The division of the Post-Homeric inheritance 30
IV Athens put to the question 47
V Plato and rational enquiry 69
VI Aristotle as Plato’s heir 88
VII Aristotle on justice103
VIII Aristotle on practical rationality 124
IX The Augustinian alternative 146
X Overcoming a conflict of traditions 164
XI Aquinas on practical rationality and justice 183
XII The Augustinian and Aristotelian background to Scottish Enlightenment 209
XIII Philosophy in the Scottish social order 241
XIV Hutcheson on justice and practical rationality 260
XV Hume’s anglicizing subversion 281
XVI Hume on practical rationality and justice 300
XVII Liberalism transformed into a tradition 326
XVIII The rationality of traditions 349
XIX Tradition and translation 370
XX Contested justices, contested rationalities 389
Index of Persons 405